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THE ROLE OF INFORMATION  IN BARGAINING:  AN 
EXPERIMENTAL  STUDY' 
BY ALVIN  E.  ROTH AND J.  KEITH MURNIGHAN 
A  fundamental  assumption  in  much  of  game  theory  and  economics  is  that  all  the 
relevant  information  for  determining  the  rational  play  of  a  game  is  contained  in  its 
structural  description.  Recent  experimental  studies  of  bargaining  have  demonstrated 
effects  due  to  information  not  included  in  the  classical  models  of  games  of  complete 
information.  The  goal  of  the experiment reported here is  to  separate these  effects  into 
components  that can  be  attributed to  the possession  of  specific  information by  specific 
bargainers, and to assess the extent to which the observed behavior can be characterized as 
equilibrium behavior. The results of the experiment permit us to identify such component 
effects,  in  equilibrium, including  effects  that depend  on  whether certain information is 
common knowledge or not. The paper closes with some speculation on the causes of these 
effects. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A  FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTION in much  of  game  theory (as well  as in much  of 
economics)  is  that  the  structural  description  of  a  game  and  the  (possibly 
cardinal)  utility  functions  of  the  players  together  constitute  all  the  relevant 
information  needed  to  determine  rational  play.  Indeed,  games  in  which  the 
players possess this information are called games of complete information. 
Recent  experimental  studies  of  bargaining  strongly  support  the  contention 
that,  even  in  games  of  complete  information,  information  absent  from  the 
classical  models  of  games  can  nevertheless systematically  influence  their out- 
comes. The present study is intended to further explore this phenomenon, both to 
help  indicate  directions in  which  a  descriptive theory  of  bargaining must  be 
modified, and to help clarify what implications this phenomenon has for theories 
primarily intended as prescriptive models of bargaining among perfectly rational 
players. 
Specifically, previous experiments revealed an effect of information in bargain- 
ing  which  cannot  be  explained  by  existing  models.  In  the  present paper, we 
report an experiment, the primary goal  of  which is to separate this effect  into 
components  that can  be  identified  as resulting from the possession  of  specific 
information by specific individuals. A  secondary goal is to assess the extent to 
which the behavior observed can be characterized as equilibrium  behavior, and 
therefore cannot  be  attributed to  simple inexperience among  the experimental 
subjects. 
We  do  not  present here a  new  theory of  bargaining, but  examine  in  detail 
certain phenomena which existing theory cannot account for, in order to indicate 
'This  work was supported by NSF  Grants No.  SOC78-09928 and No.  SES79-15356. It is also a 
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IMSSS summer workshop at Stanford, particularly with Paul Milgrom and Roger Myerson. 
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directions in which new theory must be developed. While it is not yet standard 
practice to test economic theories with experimental data, bargaining is a subject 
well  suited  to  the  endeavor,  both  because  there is  a  well  developed  body  of 
deductive theory, and because, being an activity which can take place between as 
few as two agents, it readily lends itself to reliable experimental investigation. 
The next section reviews two earlier experiments (Roth  and Malouf  [8], and 
Roth, Malouf, and Murnighan [10]), and discusses their implications. Section 3 
reports the new experiment, designed to answer questions raised by the results of 
the previous experiments. Some  of  these questions  are related to  recent theo- 
retical  developments  in  the  study  of  information,  specifically  the  concept  of 
"common knowledge." 
2.  EARLIER EXPERIMENTS 
In  order  to  test  theories  that  depend  on  the  von  Neumann-Morgenstem 
expected utilities of the players, experiments must permit the utility functions of 
the participants to be  determined. A  class of  games which makes this possible 
was introduced in Roth and Malouf [8]. 
In each game of that experiment, players bargained over the probability that 
they would receive a certain monetary prize, possibly a different prize for each 
player. Specifically,  they bargained over how  to  distribute "lottery tickets" to 
determine the probability that each player would win his personal lottery (i.e., a 
player who received 40 per cent of the lottery tickets would have a 40 per cent 
chance  of  winning  his  monetary prize and  a  60  per cent  chance  of  winning 
nothing). If no agreement was reached in the allotted time, each player received 
nothing.  So  a  player received his  prize only  if  an  agreement was  reached  on 
splitting the lottery tickets in an allowable way, and if he won the ensuing lottery. 
Otherwise he received nothing. We will refer to games of this type, in which each 
player has only two possible monetary payoffs, as binary lottery games. 
To interpret the feasible outcomes  of a binary lottery game in terms of each 
player's  utility  for  money,  recall  that  if  we  normalize  each  player's  utility 
function so that the utility for receiving his prize is 1, and the utility for receiving 
nothing is 0, then his utility for any lottery between these two alternatives is the 
probability of winning the lottery; i.e., an agreement giving a player p per cent of 
the lottery tickets gives him a utility of p.2  A  change  in the prizes is therefore 
equivalent to a change in the scale of the players' utility functions. 
Since the set of feasible utility payoffs to the players in such a game equals the 
set of allowable divisions of lottery tickets, binary lottery games can be used to 
2Note  that we  consider  the  feasible  set of  utility payoffs  to  be  defined  in  terms of  the  utility 
function of each player for the lottery which he receives, independently of the bargaining which has 
achieved this lottery, and even independently of the lottery which his opponent receives. In doing so, 
we are taking the point of view that, while these factors may influence the utility of a bargainer for 
the  agreement eventually  reached, the  description of  any  effect  which  this has  on  the  agreement 
reached belongs in the model of the bargaining process, rather than in the model of the bargaining 
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experimentally test theories which depend on the set of feasible utility payoffs. 
Note  that the set of feasible utility payoffs  does not  depend on  the size of  the 
prizes. Thus if  the players know  the  allowable  divisions of  lottery tickets, the 
game  is  one  of  complete  information,  regardless of  whether each  player also 
knows the size of the other's prize. 
Following  Nash  [6],  two-player  bargaining games  are  modelled  by  a  pair 
(S, d), where d is a point in the plane, and S is a compact convex subset of the 
plane. The interpretation is that S is the set of feasible expected utility payoffs, 
any  one  of  which  can  be  achieved  if  both  players agree. If  no  agreement is 
reached, the disagreement point d results. In a binary lottery game normalized as 
above,  S  is the set of  allowable divisions of  lottery tickets, and d is the point 
(0, 0). 
Nash  proposed that bargaining be modelled by means of a function called a 
solution, which selects a feasible outcome for every bargaining game. If B denotes 
the class of all two-player bargaining games, a solution is a function f:  B -  R2 
such that f(S,  d)  is an element of  S.  Thus a solution is a model  of bargaining 
which depends only on the information about the underlying game3 contained in 
the  model  (S, d).  Nash  characterized a  particular solution  to  the  bargaining 
problem, which, along with others, has subsequently been the object of consider- 
able study (cf. Roth [7]). Since a solution depends only on the pair (S, d),  any 
solution is a model that predicts that the outcome of a binary lottery game will 
not depend on whether the players know their opponent's prize. 
The  experiment reported in  Roth  and  Malouf  [8] was  designed  to  test  this 
hypothesis, among others. Participants played  binary lottery games with either 
full  information or partial  information. In  the  full  information  condition,  each 
player was informed of the value of both his opponent's prize and his own. In the 
partial information condition, each player was informed only of his own prize.4 
The outcomes observed in the two conditions exhibited dramatic differences. 
Outcomes in the partial information condition tended to be extremely close to an 
equal  division  of  the  lottery  tickets,  while  outcomes  in  the  full  information 
condition  shifted  significantly  towards equal  expected  monetary  payoffs;  i.e., 
when the bargainers had full information and unequal prizes, agreements tended 
to give a higher probability of winning to the player with the smaller prize. Since 
31n order to insure that such a theory of bargaining would depend only on the information about 
preferences contained in a player's utility function, Nash  further proposed that a solution should be 
independent  of  the  scale  of  the  players'  utility  functions.  Any  solution  possessing  this  property 
predicts that the outcome of a binary lottery game should not depend on the size of the prizes; i.e. it 
predicts that two games which differ only in the size of the prizes will result in the same agreement. 
4Players were seated at isolated computer terminals, and allowed to communicate by teletype, but 
were unaware of  their opponents' identity. (The only  limitations on  free communication  were that 
players were prevented from identifying themselves, or from discussing the monetary value of their 
prizes in  the partial information condition.)  The  bargaining process consisted  of  the  exchange  of 
messages and of (numerical) proposals, and terminated in agreement when a proposal was accepted 
or  in  disagreement  if  no  proposal  had  been  accepted  after  12  minutes.  The  methods  used  to 
implement the experiment are essentially those of the experiment described in Section 3 except that, 
there, players were free to make any (true or false) statements they wished about  the prizes, in all 
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the set of allowable lottery divisions, and hence the set of feasible utility payoffs, 
is not affected by the information condition, the observed difference between the 
two conditions  suggests that theories which depend only  on  the pair (S, d)  are 
insufficiently powerful to capture the complexity of this kind of bargaining.5 
Other classical  models  describe  a  game  in  greater detail.  The  strategic (or 
normal) form of  a game includes not  only  a description of  the set of  feasible 
utility payoffs,  but  also  the players' strategy choices.  In  the  games  described 
above, strategy choices concern the formulation of messages and proposals. Since 
players' strategies depend  on  the  information  they  possess,  we  must  consider 
whether the  observed results can  be  accounted  for by  the  different strategies 
available in the two information conditions. 
The experiment reported in Roth,  Malouf,  and Murnighan [10], designed to 
address this question, involved binary lottery games whose prizes were stated in 
terms of  an  intermediate commodity.  Each bargainer was  told  that the prizes 
would be expressed in "chips" having monetary value, and each player played 
four  games  under either high, intermediate, or  low information  conditions.  In 
each condition, each player knew the number of chips in his own prize and their 
monetary value, but each player's information about his opponent's prize varied 
with  the condition.  In  the high  information condition,  players knew  both  the 
number of  chips in their opponent's prize and their value. In the intermediate 
information  condition,  players knew  the  number of  chips  in  their opponent's 
prize, but not their value. In the low information condition, players knew neither 
the number of chips in their opponent's prize, nor their value. In the latter two 
conditions,  players were prevented from communicating the missing information 
about the prizes. The games were counterbalanced in the sense that, in two of the 
games, the player with the higher number of chips also had a higher value per 
chip (and hence a higher value prize), while in the other two games, the player 
with the higher number of chips had a lower value per chip and a lower value 
prize. 
The experiment took advantage of two kinds of strategic equivalence relations. 
First, binary lottery games whose prizes are expressed in both chips and money, 
played  in  the  low  information  condition  of  this  experiment,  are  strategically 
equivalent6 to binary lottery games with the same monetary prizes whose prizes 
are expressed in money alone, played in the partial information condition of the 
previous experiment. Under the rules of the low and partial information condi- 
tions, any legal message in one kind of game would be legal in the other, so the 
strategy sets are the same for both kinds of games, as are the utility functions and 
the underlying set of alternatives. 
5And,  of  course,  the  observed  dependence  of  the  outcomes  on  the  magnitude  of  the  prizes 
demonstrates that factors other than  the players' preferences over lotteries are at  work (cf.  foot- 
note 3). 
6When  we  say  two  games  are strategically equivalent,  we  essentially  mean  they  can  both  be 
represented by  the  same  strategic form. Thus  any  theory  of  games  which  depends  only  on  the 
strategic form  of  a  game  yields  the  same  predictions  for  strategically equivalent  games.  This  is 
discussed at greater length in Roth, Malouf, and Murnighan [10]. INFORMATION  IN  BARGAINING  1127 
Second, games expressed in both chips and money played under the intermedi- 
ate information condition of this experiment are strategically equivalent to games 
expressed in  money  alone  played  under the full  information  condition  of  the 
previous experiment, if the values of the prizes in each money  game are in the 
same proportion as the numbers of chips in the prizes in the corresponding chip 
game. Again, any legal message in one kind of game can be transformed into a 
legal message in the other kind of game by substituting references to chips for 
references to money (or vice versa) in any message concerning the value of the 
prizes. 
Thus  if  the  observed  difference  between  the  partial  and  full  information 
conditions  of  the  previous  experiment was  due  to  the  different  strategy sets 
available to the players, then a similar difference should be observed between the 
low  and intermediate information conditions  of  this experiment. The  "strategic 
hypothesis" predicts that games in the low information condition should lead to 
agreements in  which  the  players receive  approximately equal  probabilities  of 
winning  their prizes,  while  games  in  the  intermediate  information  condition 
should lead to agreements giving the player with the smaller number of chips a 
significantly higher probability than his opponent of winning his prize. 
Alternatively, the difference between information conditions  observed in the 
previous experiment may  be  due  to  social  conventions  among  the  bargainers, 
rather than to changes in their strategy sets. In conflicts involving a wide range of 
potential  agreements, social  conventions  may  serve to  make  some  agreements 
and  demands  more  credible  than  others. Thus  this hypothesis  views  the  low 
variance  observed  in  the  partial  information  condition  as  evidence  that  the 
agreement giving players an equal chance of winning their prizes is supported by 
a social norm that inclines both players to believe that their opponent may not 
accept less. The shift towards equal expected monetary payoffs observed in the 
full information condition is viewed as evidence that when information about the 
monetary value of the prizes is available,  the agreement giving the players equal 
expected  payoffs  is  also  supported by  such  a  convention,  so  the  bargaining 
focuses on resolving the difference between two credible positions.7 
By "social conventions," we mean customs or beliefs commonly  shared in a 
particular society.  To  be  commonly  shared,  such  conventions  must  concern 
familiar quantities.  By  stating  the  prizes  in  terms of  an  unfamiliar  artificial 
commodity ("chips") which conveys no information about more familiar quanti- 
ties such as the value of a given prize or a player's probability of winning it, this 
experiment introduced a quantity about which no social conventions apply. The 
"sociological hypothesis" predicts, therefore, that information about the number 
of  chips  in  each  prize  would  not  affect  the  bargaining:  the  low  and  high 
information conditions  of  this experiment should replicate the partial and  full 
information conditions of  the previous experiments, respectively, and the inter- 
mediate  information  condition  should  not  differ  significantly  from  the  low 
information condition. 
7Informal  analysis of transcripts of the negotiations lends support to this hypothesis. 1128  A.  E. ROTH AND  J. K. MURNIGHAN 
The observed results strongly supported the sociological hypothesis. Results in 
the low and high information conditions essentially replicated those observed in 
the  partial  and  full  information  condition  of  the  previous  experiment,  and 
intermediate information outcomes did not differ significantly from those in the 
low information condition (i.e., in the intermediate information condition, agree- 
ments tended to give both players equal probabilities, regardless of  the size of 
their prize in chips). Thus information about the artificial commodity, chips, did 
not affect the outcomes in the same way as did strategically equivalent informa- 
tion about money. 
3.  ANEW  EXPERIMENT 
In the games played in the partial information condition of Roth and Malouf 
[8] and in the low information condition of Roth, Malouf, and Murnighan [10], 
neither bargainer knew his opponent's prize,  while in the games played  in the 
full  information condition  of  R&M,  or in  the high  information  condition  of 
RM&M,  both bargainers knew their opponent's prize. The difference between 
the outcomes  in  the different information conditions  could  be  an effect which 
depends oin (i) whether the player with the higher prize knows both prizes; (ii) 
whether the player with the lower prize knows both prizes; or (iii) an interaction 
which occurs only when both players know both prizes. The experiment reported 
next is designed to separate out these possible effects. 
Also,  in the previous experiments, it was "common knowledge" whether the 
bargainers knew one  another's prizes. Information is common  knowledge in a 
game if it is known to all of the players, and if,  in addition, every player knows 
that all the players know, and that every player knows the others know that he 
knows,  and  so  forth.  (The  concept  of  common  knowledge  is  formalized  in 
Aumann [1] and Milgrom [4].) In general, two bargainers can be thought of as 
having  common  knowledge  about  an  event  if  the  event  occurs when  both  of 
them are present to see it, so that they also see each other seeing it, etc. For the 
purposes of this experiment, a set of instructions provides common knowledge to 
the  bargainers if  it  contains  the  information  that both  of  them  are receiving 
exactly the same instructions. 
Information which is common knowledge does not have "deniability": neither 
player can credibly deny  that he knows it. The  experiment described below  is 
designed  to  distinguish the effects  of  this kind of  deniability by  manipulating 
whether each player's awareness or ignorance of his opponent's prize is common 
knowledge.  In  addition,  the  players  are  given  sufficient  scope  for  strategic 
manipulation to permit at least a preliminary assessment of whether the observed 
outcomes result from equilibrium behavior. 
Design of the Experiment 
Each game of this experiment was a binary lottery game in which one player 
had a $20 prize and the other a $5 prize, and in which all possible divisions of 
lottery tickets were allowable. In all conditions  of  the experiment, each player INFORMATION  IN  BARGAINING  1129 
TABLE I 
DESIGN  OF THE SHARED-INFORMATION 
COMMON-KNOWLEDGE  EXPERIMENT 
Common  Non-Common 
Information  Knowledge  Knowledge 
Neither 
player knows  1  5 
both prizes 
Only the 








know both  4  8 
prizes 
knew at least his own prize. Each player played three identical games, against 
different, anonymous opponents.8 
The  experiment  used  a  4(information) x  2(common  knowledge)  factorial 
design  (see  Table  I).  The  information  conditions  were:  (1)  neither knows his 
opponent's prize; (2) the $20 player knows both prizes, but the $5 player knows 
only  his  own  prize;  (3)  the  $5 player knows both  prizes, but  the  $20  player 
knows only  his  own prize; and  (4) both players know both  prizes. The  second 
factor made this information common knowledge for half the bargaining pairs, 
and not common knowledge for the other half. For instance, when the $20 player 
is the only one who knows both prizes, then the (common) instructions to both 
players in the common knowledge condition reveal that the $20 player will know 
both prizes and that the $5 player will know only his own in the game about to 
be played. In the non-common  knowledge condition, the $20 player still knows 
both prizes, and the $5 player still knows only his own prize, but both players are 
told  that  the  other  bargainer may  or  may  not  know  their  prize.  After  each 
bargaining session, players were assigned new opponents, with the same informa- 
tion, common knowledge, and prizes. 
This  design  is  intended  to  permit  the  observation  of  effects  due  to  subtle 
changes in the information available to the players. For instance, conditions  1 
and 4, as numbered in Table I, closely resemble the study of Roth and Malouf 
[8], in which agreements reached in condition  1 clustered around a 50-50 split of 
lottery tickets, while agreements reached in condition  4  tended  towards agree- 
ments giving the players equal expected monetary gains (i.e., in this game, 20 per 
8Analysis of the results across the three games indicated that sequential play had no effects even 
approaching significance on  the agreements reached or on  the number of disagreements. Thus the 
remaining analyses pooled the results of each individual's three plays. 1130  A. E. ROTH AND  J. K. MURNIGHAN 
cent of the lottery tickets to the $20 player and 80 per cent to the $5 player). The 
difference between the two conditions is that the prizes are private information in 
condition  1 and  common  knowledge  in  condition  4.  If  the  difference  in  the 
outcomes  in these two conditions  is primarily due to  the fact  that players can 
compare their payoffs in condition 4, then the observed outcomes in condition 4 
should resemble those observed in condition 8, where the prizes are both known 
to both players but not common  knowledge. But if the difference between the 
observed outcomes in conditions  1 and 4 is substantially influenced by the fact 
that common  knowledge is 'undeniable,' then the outcomes  observed in condi- 
tion 8, where the shared information is deniable, should be significantly different 
from those observed in condition 4. The results in the other conditions  can be 
interpreted in a similar manner. 
Methods 
Each  participant was  seated  at  a  visually  isolated  terminal of  a  computer 
system,  called  PLATO,  which  has  advanced  graphic  displays  and  interactive 
capability.  Participants were seated  at  scattered terminals throughout a  room 
containing over 70 terminals, and received all of their instructions and conducted 
all communication via the terminal. Subjects were drawn from an introductory 
business administration course taken primarily by college juniors. Pretests were 
run with the same subject pool to make sure that the instructions were clear. 
Background information including  a  brief review of  probability theory was 
presented first. The procedures for sending messages and proposals were then 
introduced.  A  proposal  was  a  pair  of  numbers,  the  first being  the  sender's 
probability of receiving his prize and the second the receiver's probability. The 
use of the computer enabled any asymmetry in the presentation to be avoided. 
The proposal was  displayed on  a graph of  the feasible region, along  with the 
expected monetary value of each proposal.9 Bargainers could cancel a proposal 
before its transmittal. Proposals were binding on the sender, and an agreement 
was reached whenever one of the bargainers returned a proposal identical to the 
one he had just received. 
Messages were not binding. Bargainers could send any message they wished, 
with one exception. To insure anonymity, the monitor intercepted any messages 
that revealed the identity of the players. Intercepted messages were returned to 
the sender's terminal with a note that participants were not permitted to identify 
themselves. 
To  verify  their understanding of  the  rules, subjects were given  some  drills 
followed  by  a  simulated bargaining session  with  the  computer. Then  subjects 
were paired at random and the bargaining started. 
Every pair matched a player with a $5 prize against one with a $20 prize. All 
instructions were presented prior to the start of the first game. In the Common 
9In each information condition, PLATO displayed the expected monetary value which the player 
would  receive from any  proposal he  made  or received. The  opponent's  expected  value  was  only 
displayed in those conditions in which the player knew his opponent's prize. INFORMATION  IN  BARGAINING  1131 
Knowledge conditions, the instructions stated that the players were both reading 
the same instructions, and that certain private information would be presented to 
them at the end of the instructions. Thus, for example, in the $20 Player Knows/ 
Common  Knowledge  condition,  both players were instructed that one  player's 
private information would  include  both  prizes while  the other player's private 
information would include only his own prize. When the players received their 
private information, the $20 player was told both prizes and reminded that the $5 
player knew only his own prize, and the $5 player was told only his own prize, 
and reminded that his opponent knew both prizes. The distribution of informa- 
tion  in  the  other  Common  Knowledge  conditions  was  handled  in  a  similar 
manner. In all four of the Non-Common  Knowledge conditions, the instructions 
concerning  the  private  information  stated  simply  that  each  player's  private 
information might or might not include his opponent's prize.'0 
At  the end of  12 minutes or when agreement was reached (whichever came 
first), the subjects were informed of the results of that game and were asked to 
wait until all the other bargainers finished. Subsequent games used new random 
pairings. At no point were players aware of what other participants were doing, 
or of their opponent's identity. 
The bargaining process consisted of the exchange of messages and proposals. 
Participants were instructed that "your objective should  be  to  maximize your 
own earnings by taking advantage of the special features of each session." Only 
if  the bargainers reached agreement on  what percentage of  the lottery tickets 
each would receive were they able to participate in the lottery for the particular 
game being played. All transactions were automatically recorded. 
The lotteries were held after all the games were completed, and each player 
was informed of the outcomes and the amount of his winnings. A brief explana- 
tion  of  the purpose of  the experiment was  then given,  and  the  subjects were 
offered the opportunity to record comments or questions, and were directed to 
the monitor who paid them. 
Results 
The negotiation process recorded in the exchange of messages and proposals 
revealed considerable strategic manipulation. The $20 player, for instance, most 
often made no mention of the prizes; but if it was common knowledge that the 
$5 player did not know both prizes, the $20 player often misrepresented his prize. 
(One typical example: "I know that your prize is $5. Mine is only $2. I should get 
10ln  all conditions, the last sentences of the common instructions were the following. "Up to this 
point, you  and the other bargainers saw the same instructions. Now  we will give you  some private 
information." Depending on the condition, the players also received one of the following reminders 
after the private information had been presented. "The other bargainer does not know your prize and 
is aware that you don't know his prize." "The other bargainer does not know your prize and is aware 
that you know his prize." "The other bargainer knows your prize and is aware that you don't know 
his prize." "The other bargainer knows your prize and is aware that you know his prize." "The other 
bargainer may or may not know your prize and is not aware that you know his prize." "The other 
bargainer may or may not know your prize, and is not aware that you don't know his prize." 1132  A.  E. ROTH AND  J. K. MURNIGHAN 
more  than  50  per  cent.")  The  $5  player,  on  the  other hand,  often  revealed 
information when he knew the $20 player's prize. Both strategies appeared to be 
generally disbelieved. The  frequency and  timing of  misrepresentation and  the 
content of messages and proposals provide a rich source of data for analysis of 
the negotiations,  albeit beyond  the scope  of  this paper. The  remainder of  this 
section concentrates on the bargaining outcomes as measured by the percentage 
of lottery tickets which each player obtained in the different conditions. 
The  data  were  analyzed  two  ways,  with  disagreements  excluded  from  the 
sample and with disagreements included. Prior to analysis of variance on the 4 
(information conditions)  by  2  (common  knowledge  conditions)  by  2  (players) 
design, distributions were inspected to determine whether they conformed to the 
assumptions of analysis of variance. For only the agreements reached, the data 
for the $20 players' outcomes in the Neither Knows and the $20 Player Knows 
conditions are negatively skewed (see Figures 1 and 2). Far more agreements give 
the $20 player a 50 per cent chance in the lottery than anything else. In the $5 
Player  Knows  and  Both  Know  conditions,  the  data  is  neither  normal  nor 
unimodal, but bi-modal, with the two modes at or close to 20 per cent and 50 per 
cent for the $20 players' outcomes (see Figures 3 and 4). Although the skewed 
distributions might be  analyzed with  standard analysis of  variance techniques 
and  little distortion of  the  findings,  the bimodal  distributions are much  more 
difficult.  Indeed,  using  the  means  of  these  conditions  as  indicators of  central 
tendency distorts the character of the data. Thus, although means are reported, 
they  should  be  interpreted cautiously,  in  light  of  the  underlying  distributions 
observed.  All  statistical  comparisons  among  the  conditions  used  the  Mann- 
Whitney  U test, also called Wilcoxon's analysis of summed ranks. This test can 
be used for any distribution of data. 
Frequency of Agreements in Terms of the Percentage of Lottery 
Tickets Obtained by the $20 Player 
Common Knowledge  Not Common Knowledge 
Neither 
player 
knows  F 
both  R 
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TABLE II 
MEAN  OUTCOMES  TO THE $20 AND  $5 PLAYERS  IN  EACH 
INFORMATION/COMMON  KNOWLEDGE  CONDITION  WHEN 
AGREEMENTS  WERE REACHED  (DISAGREEMENTS  EXCLUDED) 
Common  Non-Common 
Information  Knowledge  Knowledge 
Neither 
player knows  48.8  51.2  47.5  52.5 
both prizes 
Only the 








know both  30.8  69.2  34.3  65.7 
prizes 
NOTE:  Outcomes  are  the  mean  lottery  percentages  obtained  by  the  $20 
players  (expressed  first) and  the $5  player  when  they  reached  agreement. 
The  data  clearly differed  across  the  conditions.  If  one  inspects  the  means 
shown  in Tables  II  and  III, for agreements only  and  for the  outcomes  of  all 
interactions including disagreements, differences among the information condi- 
tions  are obvious.  When  only  the  agreements  are  considered  (Table  II),  the 
Neither  Knows  and the $20  Player Knows  conditions  depart little from 50-50 
agreements. Giving the $5 player information about the $20 player's prize (in the 
$5 Player Knows and Both Know conditions) results in considerable movement 
toward a  20-80  agreement. Indeed,  the  movement  toward 20-80  in  these  four 
conditions (for both common  and not common knowledge) moves just past the 
midpoint between 50-50 and 20-80. 
Table  IV displays the number of  disagreements in each condition.  Compari- 
sons among conditions showed that there were more disagreements in condition 
7 (the $5 Player Knows/Not  Common Knowledge condition) than in all of the 
other conditions (F(1,258) = 6.16, p <.02)  and that conditions  7 and 8 (the $5 
Player  Knows/Not  Common  Knowledge  and  Both  Know/Not  Common 
Knowledge  conditions),  when  combined,  were  also  significantly  different 
(F(1,258)  = 7.27,p  <.01)  from the others. 
Comparisons using  the  Mann-Whitney  U  test were conducted  on  the  data 
represented in Table III, primarily within a Common Knowledge/Player  condi- 
tion and across information conditions (i.e., within the columns of the table). The 
comparisons indicate simpler differences in the not  common  knowledge condi- 
tions  than  the  common  knowledge  conditions.  Two  other  comparisons,  not 
displayed  in  the  table,  were also  conducted.  The  outcomes  of  the  $20  player 
when only he knew his opponent's prize were compared to the outcomes of the INFORMATION  IN  BARGAINING  1135 
TABLE III 
MEAN  OUTCOMES  TO THE $20 AND  $5 PLAYERS  IN  EACH 
INFORMATION/COMMON  KNOWLEDGE  CONDITION  OVER  ALL  INTERACTIONS 
(DISAGREEMENTS  INCLUDED  AS ZERO  OUTCOMES) 
Common  Knowledge  Not  Common  Knowledge 
Information  $20  Player  $5 Player  $20  Player  $5  Player 
Neither  41.6ab  43.3c  43.5a  48.2 
player knows 
both prizes 








Both players  27.2c  56.4a  25.5b  48.8 
know both 
prizes 
NOTE:  Within  a  column,  means  with  common  subscripts  are  not  significantly  different  from 
one  another  using  the  Mann-Whitney  U  test  (a =.01);  none  were  significantly  different  in  the 
Not-Common-Knowledge  conditions  for  the $5 player. 
$5 player when only he knew. In the common knowledge condition,  the unique 
information held by the $5 player led to significantly higher outcomes than those 
of the $20 player. The same comparison in the not common knowledge condition 
did not reveal a significant difference. 
The unaggregated agreements are presented in Table V. 
TABLE IV 
FREQUENCY  OF DISAGREEMENTS 
Information  Common  Knowledge  Not  Common  Knowledge 
Neither player 
knows both  4/24  (14%o)  3/36  (8%o) 
prizes 
Only the $20 
player knows  6/30  (20%)  4/24  (17%) 
both prizes 
Only the $5 
player knows  5/26  (19%o)  18/55  (33%o) 
both prizes 
Both players 
know both  5/30  (17%o)  9/35  (26%o) 
prizes 
NOTE:  m/n  indicates  m  disagreements  out  of  n games  played,  with  the percentage 
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Discussion 
First, consider the agreements only. The results in conditions  1 and 4 of  the 
experiment-the  Neither  Knows/Common  Knowledge  and  the  Both  Know/ 
Common  Knowledge conditions-replicate  the results of  Roth  and Malouf  [8]. 
When  neither player knew  his  opponent's  prize, agreements tended  to  divide 
lottery tickets equally, and when  both  players knew both  prizes, the observed 
agreements gave the $5 player a significantly higher share of the lottery tickets. 
The same can be said of conditions 5 and 8-the  Neither Knows/Not  Common 
Knowledge and the Both Know/Not  Common Knowledge conditions. 
The agreements observed in the other conditions permit us to conclude  that 
the  shift  from  equal-split agreements to  agreements favoring  the  $5  player  is 
primarily caused when the $5 player learns that his opponent  has a $20 prize. 
That is, the agreements observed in conditions  1, 2,  5, and 6, in which the $5 
player knows only his own prize, are all close to equal-split agreements. They are 
different from the agreements observed in conditions 3, 4, 7, and 8, in which the 
$5  player  knows  both  prizes.  These  agreements, which  are  not  significantly 
different from one  another, all  give  the  $5  player more  than  half  the  lottery 
tickets. Thus the primary variable influencing  the mean  agreement reached is 
whether the $5 player knows both prizes. 
The case of disagreements is somewhat more complex. The highest frequency 
of  disagreements was  observed in  Condition  7,  in  which  it  was  not  common 
knowledge that only the $5 player knew both prizes. (It is easy to see why this 
should be so, since in this condition the $5 player knows that he has the smaller 
prize, the $20 player doesn't know it, but the $5 player doesn't know that the $20 
player doesn't know it). In conditions 7 and 8, the two conditions in which it was 
not  common  knowledge that the $5 player knew both  prizes, the frequency of 
disagreements was significantly higher than in the other conditions. Thus in the 
non-common  knowledge  conditions  there  is  a  tradeoff  between  the  higher 
payoffs  demanded by the $5 player when he knows both prizes (as reflected in 
the observed agreements), and  the number of  agreements actually reached (as 
reflected  in  the  frequency  of  disagreement).  This  kind  of  tradeoff  was  not 
observed in the common knowledge conditions. A consequence of this (discussed 
in detail below) is that in the non-common  knowledge conditions, in which the 
players had considerable scope for strategic manipulation, the observed behavior 
appears to  be  in  equilibrium, while  in  the  common  knowledge  conditions,  in 
which the players had less scope for strategic manipulation, the observed behav- 
ior does  not  appear to  be  in  equilibrium. It will be  convenient  to  discuss the 
common  knowledge  conditions  separately  from  the  non-common  knowledge 
conditions, since different kinds of strategies are available to the players in the 
two sets of conditions." 
l l In analyzing the equilibrium properties of the observed outcomes, we will obviously not be able 
to analyze the complete strategy sets of the players, since these strategy sets are infinite, involving as 
they do  the choice  of both the content and timing of messages. Instead, we will consider whether 
observed  strategies were in equilibrium, by considering whether the behavior observed by either kind 
of player in any condition could have profitably been substituted for the behavior observed by either 
kind of player in any other condition. INFORMATION  IN  BARGAINING  1139 
In the four common knowledge conditions, neither player can pretend not to 
know his opponent's prize when he knows it, or pretend to know his opponent's 
prize when he doesn't, since these facts are common knowledge. However, when 
it is common knowledge that exactly one of the players knows both prizes, then 
that player is free to  make any assertion about his own prize, without fear of 
(confident) contradiction. Thus the $20 player, when he alone knows both prizes, 
is free to behave in precisely the same way as the $5 player, when he alone knows 
both prizes: the strategy set of  the player who  alone knows both prizes is not 
affected by the size of this prize. (And the player who knows only his own prize 
also has essentially the same strategy set regardless of his prize.) Thus the results 
in the common knowledge conditions probably do not result from Nash equilib- 
rium behavior, since the overall mean payoff (agreements plus disagreements) to 
the $20 player when he alone knows both prizes (34.9) is significantly less that 
the corresponding payoff to the $5 player (53.6). That is, the benefit to the player 
who knows both prizes of insisting on a larger share of the lottery tickets (as the 
$5 player did in this position) was not offset by a corresponding increase in the 
frequency of  disagreement, so  we  can  reasonably  expect  that  the  $20  players 
could have increased their overall payoffs by also adopting this strategy. 
In  the  four  non-common  knowledge  conditions,  the  players  have  different 
opportunities for strategic behavior. They cannot misrepresent their own prizes 
as  freely,  since  they  cannot  be  sure  that  their  prize  is  unknown  to  their 
opponent.12  But, since neither player knows if his opponent knows both prizes, a 
player who knows both prizes is always free to behave precisely as if he knew 
only his own prize. (Of course a player who does not know his opponent's prize 
cannot  behave precisely as  if  he  did,  since,  for  instance,  he  cannot  state  his 
opponent's prize). If the observed behavior in these conditions is in equilibrium, 
it must not be the case that players who do not know their opponent's prize do 
better on average than those who do, since, if this were the case, a player who 
knew both prizes could profit from adopting the strategy he would have used if 
he knew only his own prize. (And, to the extent that a player who does not know 
his opponent's prize can behave as if he did, equilibrium requires that players 
who do know their opponent's prize do no better on average than those who do 
not). 
First consider the $20 players in  the non-common  knowledge  conditions.  A 
$20 player whose opponent knew both prizes (i.e. in conditions 7 and 8) received 
a mean overall payoff of 25.5 if he knew his opponent's prize (condition 8) and 
25.0  if he  didn't (condition  7), which  are not  significantly different from one 
another (cf. Table III). A  $20 player whose opponent knew only his own prize 
(i.e., in conditions 5 or 6) received a mean overall payoff of 40.9 if he knew his 
opponent's prize (condition 6) and 43.5 if he didn't (condition 5) which also do 
not differ significantly from one another. Thus a $20 player who managed to find 
121n  any  event,  unlike  the  common  knowledge  conditions,  in  the  non-common  knowledge 
conditions there is no significant difference between the mean overall payoff of the $20 player when 
he alone knows both prizes (40.9) and the mean overall payoff of the $5 player when he alone knows 
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out  whether his  opponent  knew  both  prizes'3 could  not  improve  his  overall 
payoff by acting as he would have if his own information about his opponent's 
prize were different. And a $20 player who thought it was equally likely that his 
opponent did or didn't know that his prize was $20 faced a fifty-fifty gamble of 
receiving 25.5 or 40.9  if he  knew  the $5  player's prize, or a  fifty-fifty  gamble 
between 25.0 or 43.5 if he didn't, and, since these two gambles do  not  signifi- 
cantly differ, he also could not improve his expected overall payoff by acting as 
he would have if his own information about his opponent's prize were different. 
The situation faced by  the $5 players in the non-common  knowledge condi- 
tions was slightly different, since the $20 players (unlike the $5 players) virtually 
never revealed when they knew their opponent's prize. If we suppose then that 
each $5 player thought it was equally likely that his opponent did or didn't know 
his prize was $5, then he faced a fifty-fifty gamble of receiving 48.8 or 42.0 if he 
knew the $20 player's prize, or a fifty-fifty gamble between 42.4  or 48.2  if he 
didn't. Since the expected values of these two gambles do not significantly differ, 
the $5 player also has no opportunity to improve his expected overall payoff by 
acting as he would have if his information about his opponent's prizes had been 
different.  14 
Thus,  in  the  non-common  knowledge  conditions,  the  observed  outcomes 
appear to conform to Nash equilibrium behavior. 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has reported the third in a series of experiments which use binary 
lottery games to investigate bargaining. Because agreements in a binary lottery 
game give  each  player a  lottery between  only  two  possible  monetary payoffs, 
these games meet the conditions needed  to be games of complete information, 
since knowing the feasible lotteries which each player can achieve is the same as 
knowing  the  set  of  feasible  von  Neumann-Morgenstern  utility payoffs  to  the 
player. 
Roth and Malouf [8] showed that information about the monetary value of the 
prizes (which does  not  alter the set of  feasible utility payoffs)  decisively  influ- 
ences the outcome  of bargaining, although such information is not reflected in 
the classical cooperative models  of  games. Roth,  Malouf,  and  Murnighan [10] 
showed that the effect of such information also could not be accounted  for by 
theories based entirely on classical strategic (noncooperative) models of games, 
since  strategically  equivalent  variations  on  the  information  available  to  the 
players were shown to have different effects. Thus, the previously observed effect 
is due at least in part to the "sociological" content of information about money. 
The  present experiment explored the component  causes  of  this information 
effect,  and  investigated  the  equilibrium properties of  the  observed  behavior. 
13Which was often the case, since $5 players who knew both prizes frequently mentioned the $20 
prize in their messages. 
14Note that, although  the  $5  player's choice  of  strategy does  not  influence  his  own  expected 
overall payoff, the $20 player's expected payoff is around 25 if the $5 player acts as if he knows both 
prizes, and around 40 if he acts as if he doesn't. INFORMATION  IN  BARGAINING  1141 
Three principal conclusions  were reached.  First,  the  effect  of  information  on 
what agreements are reached is primarily a function of whether the player with 
the smaller monetary prize knows both prizes. Second, whether this information 
is common knowledge influences the frequency with which disagreements occur. 
Third, in  the non-common  knowledge  conditions,  the relationship among  the 
outcomes in the various conditions showed virtually no departures from equilib- 
rium. 
The  last observation strongly suggests that the information  effects  observed 
here should properly be the concern not only of descriptive theories of bargain- 
ing, but also of prescriptive theories of bargaining among rational agents. That is, 
since  the  observed  results  of  the  non-common  knowledge  conditions  are  in 
equilibrium, it does not appear that a rational agent in any of these conditions 
could expect to receive more than the observed payoff, even if he were aware, for 
instance, of the results of this experiment. 
Taken together, these experiments permit us to speculate fairly specifically on 
the cause of the observed information effects. The first experiment demonstrated 
an effect of information about the monetary prizes which could not be accounted 
for  in  terms of  the  preferences  of  the  players  over  the  set  of  consequences 
(lotteries). The second experiment showed that this effect could not be accounted 
for by the set of available actions (strategies). The third experiment showed that 
the effect is consistent with rational behavior. So, if we continue to hypothesize 
that the players are (approximately) Bayesian utility maximizers, the effect  of 
information must be due to a change in the players' subjective beliefs. Thus, for 
example, information about the monetary prizes, and whether this information is 
common knowledge, may influence the players' subjective probabilities concern- 
ing  what  agreements  are  likely  to  be  acceptable  to  their  opponents.  Since 
outcomes  were observed to  be  at least approximately in  equilibrium, it  seems 
likely  that such probability assessments are approximately correct so  that  the 
appropriate tradeoff exists between  the  'toughness' of  the bargaining and  the 
frequency of disagreement. 
Similar tradeoffs  are  observed  in  theories  of  bargaining  under  incomplete 
information (e.g.,  see  Harsanyi and  Selten [2], or Myerson  [5]). It  thus seems 
likely that analytic theories of rational behavior can be constructed to account 
for the phenomena observed here. Such theories will have to deal explicitly with 
the way in which shared information influences the subjective probabilities of the 
players. 
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NOTE  ADDED  IN  PROOF:  In Roth and Schoumaker [11], an experiment is reported whose results 
give direct support to the hypothesis that phenomena of the kind reported here are due to changes in 
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